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DEFENDING YOUR CLIENT’S PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SPACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
THE LUNAR LITIGATOR
Blake Gilson*
Are there property rights on the moon? Specifically, if a private person
takes possession of property on the moon, whether real estate or removable
resources, does he have a legally cognizable claim? How would he enforce
such a claim in practice? The language of the treaty governing such
matters, the Outer Space Treaty, leaves the question ambiguous. While the
Treaty prohibits national claims to sovereignty over lunar territory,
whether this rule restricts private ownership claims is an open question.
Though much has been written on normative questions of the best legal
regime for regulating property in outer space and on celestial bodies, the
positive question of the current status of such rights has been neglected.
While elaborating a new framework for what is currently viewed as an
unworkable regime, scholars have only superficially addressed the issue of
the existence and enforceability of property rights on the moon.
This Note attempts to remedy this gap in the scholarship by examining
three legal doctrines—property law, international law, and space law—in
order to provide a snapshot of the current state of the law governing
property rights on celestial bodies such as the moon. This Note argues that
the framework for litigating legal ownership in space lie at the nexus of
these three bodies of doctrine.
The goal of this Note is to provide a toolbox for future litigators. A clear
picture of current law governing property rights on celestial bodies will
help to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the existing legal framework and
thereby provide a better grounding for future policy conversations. This
Note attempts to create this clear picture by describing and analyzing three
types of property disputes that might arise in outer space and how they each
might be litigated if they arose tomorrow.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a day in the not-too-distant future when private mining
companies are trying to extract valuable minerals from the moon. Mining
requires water 1 and, since water on the moon is concentrated in certain
spots, 2 the space available for profitable mining is limited. Imagine that
Company A has no right to own any land or minerals on the moon.
Imagine further that Company B, a sort of corporate hyena, keeps an eye on
companies like A, and swoops in to extract the minerals ahead of A when A
finds a prime site for extraction.3 Company A will have to expend great
effort and financial resources to locate and extract the minerals. Will A also
have to spend money on guards and weaponry to defend its stake from
companies like B? Without the right to own the property, A may have no
choice but to take such security measures. Given the added expense of the
defensive muscle, the whole venture may not be economically feasible.4
This scenario may sound like science fiction, a “problem” fit only for afterdinner conversation, but these dilemmas may emerge sooner than one might
think.
The Outer Space Treaty 5 was signed in the late 1960s, in the context of
the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union. 6 The main
concerns addressed by the treaty were the prevention of the use of outer
space and celestial bodies as bases for military infrastructure by one of the
superpowers, and the prevention of military conflict over possession of
outer space and celestial bodies.7
As the Outer Space Treaty enters its forty-second year, the
circumstances, concerns, and interests involved in the occupation and use of
lunar territory have changed. 8 While preventing the militarization of space
1. See National Handbook of Recommended Methods for Water Data Acquisition,
PUBL’NS OF THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ch. 11.G, http://pubs.usgs.gov/chapter11/
chapter11G.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). If any human workers were needed onsite,
they would obviously require water as well. Not having to carry water to the moon would
reduce the expense and increase the commercial viability of mining endeavors. Ned Potter,
Water on the Moon: A Billion Gallons, ABC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/
Technology/water-moon-nasa-impact-probe/story?id=11939079 (“Water, essential for
human survival, would be heavy and expensive for spacecraft to bring from earth.”).
2. See Studies Show More Evidence of Water on Moon, Mars, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2010,
4:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/12/us-mars-water-idUSTRE63B5MT201
00412.
3. A prime site for extraction would be one containing valuable resources and near a
water source.
4. For a new theory of property based on considerations of costs saved by having
enforceable property rights, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of
Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 538 (2005) (proposing a theory that property law “is
organized around creating and defending the value inherent in stable ownership”).
5. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
6. See The Outer Space Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/outerspace (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
7. See id.
8. Compare Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and
International Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to
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is still an active concern, 9 the commercial and economic potential of space
travel and lunar development have become equally pressing. 10 China,
India, the United States, and Russia have all announced plans to build
permanent lunar bases. 11 The moon is now known to contain significant
amounts of helium-3 (He-3), which is believed to be an ideal fuel for
producing energy by nuclear fusion. 12
Privately funded space travel has been a reality since 2004. 13 Various
private companies are engaged in a race to develop the space tourism
industry. 14 Successful companies will lower the cost of getting to space,
just as the cost of air travel decreased after its origin in the early twentieth
century. 15 Meanwhile, United States policy has moved toward facilitating
the commercial development of space. Congress passed the Commercial
Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, 16 the purpose of which is to
“promote the development of the emerging commercial human space flight
industry.” 17
Given all of these developments, the question of whether private parties
may claim lunar property rights will likely become a live issue within the
lifetimes of those reading this Note. Whether it is a hotel on the moon 18 or
Survive?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 37, 59 (2008) (quoting space lawyer Ogunsola Ogunbanwo’s
statement that the Treaty addressed concerns that were current at the time of enactment),
with Richard B. Bilder, A Legal Regime for the Mining of Helium-3 on the Moon: U.S.
Policy Options, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 277–80 (2010) (arguing that the United States
needs to change the current international legal regime to make lunar resource exploitation
more practicable).
9. See ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., Bill Carswell, The Outer Space and Moon Treaties and the Coming Moon
Rush, SPACE DAILY (Apr. 18, 2002), http://www.spacewar.com/news/oped-02c.html
(describing China’s space program and predicting a new “space race” around economic
growth through development of space resources, rather than military expansion).
11. China Aims for Lunar Base After 2020, MOON DAILY (Sept. 26, 2007),
http://www.moondaily.com/reports/China_aims_for_lunar_base_after_2020_999.html;
International Space Race to Mine the Moon for Nuclear Fuel Underway, WORLD TIME NEWS
REP. (July 12, 2009), http://www.wtnrradio.com/story.php?story=366.
12. See Bilder, supra note 8, at 246–47 (observing that He-3 is incredibly rich in energy,
as well as “safe and non-polluting”); Mark Williams, Mining the Moon, TECH. REV. (Aug.
23, 2007), http://www.technologyreview.com/Energy/19296/.
13. John Schwartz, Manned Private Craft Reaches Space in a Milestone for Flight, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A1.
14. See, e.g., VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2011); see also Louisa Hearn, Space Race to Take Tourists out of This World, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/space-raceto-take-tourists-out-of-this-world-20100921-15kuw.html.
15. See Hearn, supra note 14 (“Space tourism . . . is a bit like the way aviation started
last century. It began with a few magnificent men in their flying machines and slowly got to
where we are today.”).
16. 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101–70121 (2006).
17. Press Release, House Comm. on Sci., Space Bill Rockets Toward Congressional
Approval (Mar. 4, 2004), quoted in Commercialization of Space: Commercial Space
Launch Amendments Act of 2004, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619, 619 (2004) [hereinafter
Commercial Space].
18. Cf. Stuart McDill, Space Hotel Says It’s on Schedule to Open in 2012, REUTERS
(Nov. 2, 2009, 4:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A151N20091102;
Jeremy Hsu, Space Hotel Pioneer Bigelow Envisions Inflatable Moon Bases, POPSCI (Apr.
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a mining expedition there, 19 private investors will expect and require some
level of protection of their right to the property on which they operate their
businesses.
It would be advisable to sort out the complex theoretical and practical
legal issues so that wise and thoughtful policy decisions can be made when
the time comes. This Note will sort out those legal issues by examining
three prototypical property disputes, and how a litigator might approach
them under the current state of the law. The first type of dispute involves
trespass, as in our Company A/Company B hypothetical. 20 The second
type is an unlawful ouster, where an intruder company occupies land
purportedly owned by another company so that the claimed owner cannot
use it at all. For example, Company D marks an area of the moon with a
fence and perhaps machinery and personnel, and Company E removes
Company D’s machinery and occupies the land with its own machinery and
personnel. 21 The third type of dispute involves nuisance, which could
occur where neighboring land is being used in a way that interferes with a
purported owner’s use of his land. For example, Company X is extracting
water from its land, and Company Y, on neighboring land, is digging a hole
that causes the ground to shift, making Company X’s job more difficult. 22
Part I of this Note lays out the historical and legal background of the
problem. Part I.A.1 discusses what is meant by a “property right” and
examines two theories of property current in legal scholarship. Since an
action to defend a lunar property right could be brought in any country, Part
I.A.2 compares property rights in the world’s two dominant legal traditions,
civil and common law. Part I.B first discusses the development of space
law beginning with the relevant treaties. It then considers U.S. statutes
affecting space, and executive policy with respect to space in different
countries. Part I.C explores possible ways that lunar property rights might
reach adjudication, and the legal principles and rules of decision that would
apply. Finally, Part I.D outlines the legal regimes governing property in
Antarctica and the deep seabed. These two situations offer useful analogies
to the international legal regime that governs outer space.
Part II discusses the conflicting interpretations of the Outer Space
Treaty’s non-appropriation clause.
Part II.A examines conflicting
interpretations of the plain language of the clause. Part II.B examines the
disagreement over whether countries violate international law merely by
recognizing or recording private property claims in outer space. Part II.C
outlines differing opinions on whether the “common heritage of mankind”
doctrine applies to the moon, thereby ruling out private ownership.
15, 2010, 10:27 AM), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-04/space-hotelpioneer-envisions-inflatable-moon-bases.
19. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
20. The remedy for this type of property violation is called trespass. See infra notes 66,
69 and accompanying text.
21. The remedy for this type of property violation is called ejectment. See infra notes
65–67 and accompanying text.
22. The remedy for this type of property violation is called nuisance. See infra notes 72–
73 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part III makes predictions as to the likely outcome of litigation
over lunar property claims in a variety of forums. Part III then suggests an
international regime whose purpose would be to make the status of lunar
property more settled and less ambiguous.
I. THE ELEMENTS OF PROPERTY
Part I.A of this Note attempts to ground the discussion in two commonly
accepted definitions of the term “property,” and to see how those
definitions fit into the world’s two dominant legal traditions, the civil
tradition and the common law tradition. Part I.B describes the international
laws, and some of the national laws and policies within the framework of
which property in space must be examined. Part I.C discusses which courts
would adjudicate a lunar property dispute, what law would apply, and what
policy concerns would form the basis for any adjudication. Part I.D
examines the international legal regimes governing Antarctica and the deep
seabed as analogous to lunar property.
A. What Is Property?
This section considers some basic questions of property law. Namely,
what is a plaintiff asking a court to do in determining that property rights
are present? Since property is a legal construct, 23 a rule or set of rules is
necessary and sufficient to give rise to what is recognizable as property.
Part I.A.1 of this Note will suggest a broad theoretical basis for what would
constitute such a set of rules, and Part I.A.2 will discuss how to orient that
set of rules in the common law and civil law contexts.
1. A Right Is a Remedy
It is a maxim of both law and equity that “where there is a right, there is a
remedy.” 24 That is, if one has a “right” to something, the legal machinery
of courts and judges must be able to enforce that right. 25 This maxim holds
up well under the examination of common sense. After all, what would it
mean to have a right which, were it violated, would leave the right-holder
without any action that could be taken through the legal system to force the
violator to respect the right? 26 A “right” in such a situation would be
meaningless; it would amount to nothing at all. 27 A right is in fact
23. As English philosopher David Hume suggests, property arises artificially from law,
not from nature. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 528–29 (Oxford Univ. Press
1888) (1739–40). This view was endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) (“[N]ot all economic interests [in land]
are ‘property rights’; only those . . . which have the law back of them . . . .”).
24. HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 46–47 (1845) (“[I]t is a vain
thing to imagine a right without a remedy, for want of right and want of remedy are
reciprocal.”). The original is “[u]bi jus, ibi remedium.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1876
(9th ed. 2009).
25. See BROOM, supra note 24, at 47.
26. See id.
27. Id.
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“logically identical” to the remedy available to enforce it;28 a right and its
remedy are one and the same.
Rights in property are notoriously difficult to define; 29 a wide variety of
historical and political connotations accompany the word “property.” 30
However, among legal scholars, there are two widely accepted approaches
for defining property rights. 31 These are the “bundle of rights approach”32
and the “right to exclude” approach.
Under the bundle of rights approach, the set of rules that constitute
property in a thing secures a collection, or bundle, of rights with respect to
that thing as against other persons. 33 That is, the law holds in reserve a
bundle of remedies, in case anyone should violate one of the rights an
owner holds with respect to a piece of his property. 34 The three main rights
assumed to be in the full bundle of property rights are the rights to exclude,
to use, and to dispose of the property. 35 These rights are seen as equally
dispensable, so that they can be individually added to or subtracted from the
bundle at will. 36
The alternative approach—right to exclude—to defining property is
similar, but holds that the bundle of rights approach “falls short as it does
not indicate what part of a bundle of separable rights . . . is the necessary
minimum to constitute property, implying that the word may have no
common convention and may thus be meaningless.” 37 This camp argues
that the right to exclude is the core, indispensable minimum right that
constitutes property. 38 This exclusion school of thought further argues that
“the positive ‘bundle’ of rights like possession, use, and alienation can all
be derived from the negative exclusionary right.”39
28. Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 255, 255–56 (1961).
29. See O. Lee Reed, What Is “Property”?, 41 AM. BUS L.J. 459, 459–60 & nn.5–9
(2004).
30. Id.
31. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
4–6 (2010).
32. See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING, RAYMOND R. COLETTA & M.C. MIROW, GLOBAL
ISSUES IN PROPERTY LAW 24 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 2 (1990).
33. Epstein, supra note 32, at 3.
34. See infra Part I.A.2.b; see also supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
35. See Epstein, supra note 32, at 3–4.
36. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 22 NOMOS: PROPERTY 69
(1980). For example, a lease could be seen as an arrangement whereby a tenant acquires
from a landlord the rights to use and to exclude others (including the landlord) from the
property, while the landlord retains the right to dispose of the property by, for instance,
selling it.
37. Reed, supra note 29, at 459.
38. See, e.g., id. at 473; see also id. at 487 (“At the very heart of property lies its singular
conceptual core, which is the private right of exclusion.”).
39. Id. at 488. The exclusion right is “negative” in the sense that it puts a duty on others
not to do something, namely not to interfere with the owner’s property. See id. at 490–91.
The other rights mentioned are “positive” in the sense that they allow an owner to do certain
things with respect to the property. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right
to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998).
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Both camps agree that the right to exclude others from one’s property is
at least sufficient for the purpose of having rights in that property. 40 The
camps differ in that the exclusionary school considers the exclusionary right
necessary as well as sufficient, while the “bundle” school holds the
exclusionary right unnecessary. Other rights which the “bundle” school
considers equally sufficient include the rights to use the property and to
dispose of or “alienate” it. 41 The next subsection examines how these
individual rights are treated and defended in the common law and civil law
traditions.
2. When in Rome: How Property Is Conceived and Protected
in Different Jurisdictions
There are two globally influential legal traditions, the civil and common
law traditions. 42 While the common law tradition is the basis of law in
England, the United States, and most of the former British Empire,43 the
civil law tradition, originating in Roman law, 44 has informed the legal
systems of countries throughout the world. 45 Because the law of property is
a central concept of civil law handed down from the Roman models, 46 it is
likely to be similar in all civil law countries,47 despite the separate
evolution of laws in those countries.48 Civil law is generally code-based,
with each nation having its own code, or set of written laws.49 The civil
40. Compare Epstein, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that the right to exclude is equivalent
to the right to possess, and that the latter is part of the “standard definition” of property),
with Reed, supra note 29, at 491 (“[P]roperty is an exclusionary right . . . .”).
41. “Alienate” is defined as “[t]o transfer or convey . . . to another.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 84. In other words, alienate means to voluntarily relinquish
all of one’s rights in a thing and grant those same rights to another person. See MERRILL &
SMITH, supra note 31, at 5 (comparing the view that, while exclusion can “be supplemented
with additional rights and privileges,” the right to exclude others “forms the core of the
concept of property itself” with the view that “[n]o particular [right] in the bundle—
including the right to exclude—is privileged, and the measure of which bundles are preferred
to which others is simply a matter of social policy”).
42. See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL
14–15 (2d ed. 1999) (identifying the common law and civil law traditions as “the two major
legal traditions in the modern Western world”).
43. Id. at 170.
44. Id. at 44.
45. In particular, Roman law formed the basis for the French and German civil codes,
while the French and German codes in turn formed the basis for law codes throughout the
world. Id. at 44–45. The French code formed the basis for the civil codes of several
European countries, including Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the civil codes of
Latin American countries, as well as the codes of countries formerly part of the French
colonial empire. Id. The German Civil Code was influential in the development of the law
codes of eastern European nations, as well as Greece, Italy, Japan, and Korea. Id. at 46–47.
46. Id. at 51 (“All the major civil codes deal with a body of substantive law . . . still
similar in important respects to, Justinian’s Institutes: [including] property . . . .”).
Justinian’s Institutes constitute a part of the civil tradition’s founding body of written law,
the Corpus Juris Civilis. Id. at 18–19.
47. Id. at 51 (explaining that the influence of Justinian’s Institutes “still links the civil
law systems as they move further and further from their common historical roots”).
48. See supra note 45.
49. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 42, at 31.
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tradition lacks the common law rule of precedent, which requires judges to
follow previous decisions as binding law. 50
a. Civil Law Property Protection
The civil law tradition is the basis of law in much of the world, including
the majority of Europe and some African, Asian, and South American
countries. 51
The civil tradition provides a range of “possessory actions.” 52 The civil
law traditionally views property as an indivisible phenomenon of
“ownership” with respect to a thing. 53 Once a court finds that an individual
is an “owner,” that individual has the rights to possess, to use, and to
dispose of the property. 54 These rights are protected through in rem
actions 55 against any person “who makes [an owner’s exercise of their
rights] impossible.” 56 Also relevant to the discussion here is the deep
rooted tradition that possession of something unclaimed establishes
ownership in the civil law tradition.57 Civil law conceptualizes property as
based in natural law, 58 which may allow the recognition of property rights
even without territorial sovereignty. 59
In France, the action of reintegrande is used to eject a person who has
ousted the owner from possession of the property. 60 The complainte can
also be used to eject a person attempting to oust the owner from possession
if the owner has been in possession for at least a year, and the owner’s
possession is “continuous, peaceful, public and unequivocal.”61
In Germany, an owner can bring a “possessory action” whenever another
“interfere[s] with possession” or causes a “disturbance of possession.”62

50. Id. at 263 (comparing the civil law tradition, where precedent “is often noted . . . as
teaching something,” with the common law tradition, where precedent “exists separately as
law to be followed”).
51. See supra note 45.
52. “Possessory actions” are legal devices used in the civil law system to recover
possession of property. K.W. RYAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CIVIL LAW 153 (1962).
53. See JIANFU CHEN, FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORISATION TO PRIVATE LAW 138
(1995).
54. Id.
55. In rem actions are actions with respect to a physical object. Id. at 137.
56. Id.
57. In ancient Roman law, occupatio was the “acquisition of ownership by . . . taking
possession of that which has no owner, and with the intention of keeping it as one’s own.”
George Long, Occupatio, in JOHN MURRAY, A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN
ANTIQUITIES 260 (1875), available at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/
Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Occupatio.html.
Currently, long-term possession can
sometimes “ripen” into ownership. See CHEN, supra note 53, at 138.
58. See UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 14–18 (2000).
59. Wayne White, The Legal Regime for Private Activities in Outer Space, in SPACE:
THE FREE-MARKET FRONTIER 83, 96 (2002).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 153–54.
62. Id. at 154–55.
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This action would seem to protect both the rights of exclusion and use.63
More generally, civil law jurisdictions protect possession and exclusion
rights through possessory actions, and protect use (i.e., not being disturbed
in the use and enjoyment of one’s own land) through “proprietary
actions.” 64
b. Common Law Property Protection
At common law, the right to exclude others from one’s property is
enforced through the actions of ejectment 65 and trespass 66. Ejectment
requires a showing that the defendant is in possession of all or part of the
land to which the plaintiff has a right to possession.67 This is the Company
D/Company E hypothetical. 68 Trespass is an action for damages for either
unlawful entry by a defendant onto the plaintiff’s land, or any unlawful
interference with the plaintiff’s right to exclude others from the land.69
This is the Company A/Company B hypothetical. 70 In either case, at
common law the plaintiff need only show a claim to the land superior to the
defendant, not an absolute claim to title.71 The actions of trespass and
ejectment protect the right to exclude.
To enforce the right to use, both the common law and equity provide
remedies to punish or prevent the tort of nuisance.72 Nuisance law protects
an owner from uses of neighboring land which “unreasonably interfere”
with the owner’s use of his land. 73 This is the Company X/Company Y
hypothetical. 74 A person who is found to create a nuisance can be liable for
damages to neighboring landowners harmed by the nuisance, or can be
enjoined to terminate the nuisance on pain of contempt. 75
The right to alienate one’s property is not protected by any particular
action; instead, it is enforced by the law of contract.76 After property has
63. Id. at 155 (“First, there exists . . . a claim for recovery of possession by one who has
been deprived of direct possession . . . [by] a possessor in defective possession.
Secondly . . . a possessor has a claim based on disturbance of possession for removal of the
disturbance and an injunction against further disturbance.”). The common law protections of
the rights to exclude and to use property through trespass, ejectment, and nuisance, see infra
Part I.A.2.b, provide a useful comparison to these civil law doctrines.
64. MATTEI, supra note 58, at 173–75.
65. See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Ejectment § 1 (2010).
66. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
67. Id. §§ 1, 19.
68. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
69. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 1 (2010).
70. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
71. RYAN, supra note 52, at 156–57.
72. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 31, at 193 (“Nuisance differs from trespass in that
nuisance protects use and enjoyment rather than possession.”).
73. R. WILSON FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 845 (2d ed. 2006).
74. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
75. FREYERMUTH, supra note 73, at 844–45.
76. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 31, at 91 (noting that “the policy of the law is to
promote alienability,” and that “[t]otal restraints on alienation . . . are always struck down as
violating this [public] policy”). See generally id. at 159–66 (discussing methods of enforcing
an agreed transfer of property).
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been transferred, the laws of trespass, ejectment, or nuisance are at the new
owner’s disposal. 77
B. Laws in Space: Treaties, Statutes, and Policy
This section examines the laws that affect and regulate human activities
in space and with respect to celestial bodies such as the moon, focusing on
the acquisition of property. Part I.B.1 discusses the treaties that together
constitute the international space law framework. Part I.B.2 discusses U.S.
space law and its encouragement of private commercial development of
space resources. Part I.B.3 then discusses United States commercial space
law policy and how space commercialization policy differs throughout the
world.
1. The International Treaty Regime
There are five international treaties relevant to human activities in space:
the Outer Space Treaty; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 78 (Moon Agreement); the
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space 79 (Rescue Agreement); the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects 80 (Liability Convention); and the Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space81 (Registration Convention). All of
these treaties are widely accepted by the space-faring nations and most of
the world except for the Moon Agreement, which is widely viewed as a
failure. 82 Only thirteen countries have both signed and ratified it, 83 and
none of these countries have ever sent anyone into space. 84
77. Id. at 1–3 (noting that subsequent to transfer, the transferee becomes the “owner,”
and that nuisance and trespass are among the remedies available to an owner).
78. Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
79. Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement] (entered into force
Dec. 3, 1968).
80. Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention] (entered into force
with respect to the United States Oct. 9, 1973).
81. Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter Registration Convention] (entered into
force Sept. 15, 1976).
82. Sarah Coffey, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural
Resources in Outer Space, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 127 (2009); see also Henry R.
Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the Commercial World:
Property Rights Without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 97 (2005) (“[I]t is highly unlikely
that the major space faring nations will ever agree to a Common Heritage agreement for the
moon.”); id. at 85–86 (noting that “[t]he Moon Agreement . . . declar[es] the moon to be the
common heritage of mankind,” and that “[f]uture enforcement of the Moon Agreement’s
common heritage provisions obviously remains questionable”); Rosanna Sattler,
Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 23, 30 (2005); Lynn Fountain, Note, Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the
Paralysis Produced by the “Common Heritage of Mankind” Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV.
1753, 1763–64 (2003).
83. Four countries have signed the treaty but not ratified it. See Coffey, supra note 82, at
127–28 & n.57. Ratification and signature are different ways a country may show intent to
be bound by a treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 11, May 23, 1969, 1155
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The Outer Space Treaty establishes that “the moon and other celestial
bodies [are] not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty,
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” 85 Whether this
clause prohibits private individuals from claiming property in lunar land or
resources is the subject of dispute. 86 The Moon Agreement, however,
unequivocally rules out private ownership on the moon. 87 Rights to exploit
lunar resources would be apportioned by an international body 88 which
does not currently exist. 89
Nations party 90 to the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention
are liable for damages caused by people or objects launched into space from
their territory. 91 Under the Liability Convention, Country A can claim
money damages from Country B, where persons or equipment launched
into space from B caused “damage” to persons of A. 92 The Outer Space
Treaty likewise provides for liability of one nation to another when persons
or objects launched from the former “damage” the persons of the latter,
including when such damage takes place on “the moon or other celestial
bodies.” 93 The Registration Convention requires a country from whose
territory any objects are launched to maintain a registry of such objects.94
The registering nation must inform the United Nations Secretary-General of

U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Signature requires only that a representative
of the country sign the treaty, while ratification is “confirmation and acceptance of a
previous act, thereby making the act valid . . . . [For example,] action taken by a legislature
to make binding a treaty negotiated by the executive [is ratification].” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 1376.
84. Coffey, supra note 82, at 127–28 & n.57.
85. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. II.
86. See infra Part II.
87. Moon Agreement, supra note 78, at arts. 11(1), 11(3) (stating that the moon is the
“common heritage of mankind” and that “[no] part thereof or natural resources in place, shall
become property of any . . . non-governmental entity or of any natural person”).
88. Id. at art. 11(5).
89. Cf. Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for Exploitation of Outer Space
Mineral Resources, 88 NEB. L. REV. 794, 813–14 (2010).
90. When a country becomes a party to a treaty, it agrees to abide by the treaty as law.
See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 83, at art. 2 (“[A party] means a State which has
consented to be bound by the treaty . . . .”). The U.S. Constitution provides that treaties to
which the United States is a party become U.S. law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).
For a discussion on the enforceability of treaties as U.S. law, see Leonie W. Huang, Note,
Which Treaties Reign Supreme? The Dormant Supremacy Clause Effect of Implemented
Non-self-executing Treaties, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2211 (2011).
91. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VI; Liability Convention, supra note 80, at
art. VIII(1). Note that the space law treaties all refer to the “launching states” of a party
doing damage, rather than the home country of the party. The “jurisdiction and control,” id.
at art. VIII, that a state maintains over a party in outer space is in the state from which the
party launched, regardless of his citizenship.
92. Liability Convention, supra note 80, at art. VIII(1) (“A State which suffers damage,
or whose natural or juridical persons suffer damage, may present to a launching State a claim
for compensation for such damage.”).
93. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VII.
94. Registration Convention, supra note 81, at art. II(1).
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any launch, along with data about each launch.95 The Secretary-General in
turn enters that information in a Register that is freely accessible to all.96
The country from which a party launches people or objects into outer space
retains “jurisdiction and control” over that party according to the Outer
Space Treaty. 97
2. U.S. Statutes: Moving Towards Commercialization
U.S. space policy started as an outgrowth of the Cold War. 98 After the
Soviet Union successfully launched the first artificial orbital satellite,
Sputnik, the U.S. became determined to win the space race. 99 After the
moon landing in 1969, the U.S. government provided NASA with a
renewed mission by charging it with advancing commercial activity in
space. 100 By the early 1980s, NASA was relying on contracts with private
companies to provide it with the technology and services needed to carry
out the scientific exploration of space.101 President Reagan, believing the
private sector to be more efficient than the public sector, allowed the private
sector to conduct government activities such as supplying NASA’s
technology needs. 102 Congress endorsed and furthered the drive to
commercialize space 103 in 1984. It amended the appropriations bill that
funded the space program to provide that “[t]he general welfare of the
United States of America requires that [NASA] seek and encourage, to the
maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space.” 104 That
same year, Congress passed the Commercial Space Launch Act 105 (Launch
Act), which made the Department of Transportation responsible for
regulating the space industry. 106

95. Id. at art. IV.
96. Id. at art. III.
97. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VIII.
98. Roger D. Launius, Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age, NASA,
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/sputnik/sputorig.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2011).
99. Commercial Space, supra note 17, at 621. See generally Sputnik and the Dawn of the
Space Age, NASA, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/sputnik (last visited Nov. 16,
2011).
100. Commercial Space, supra note 17, at 622.
101. See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, One Half Century and Counting: The Evolution of
U.S. National Space Law and Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
405, 410 (2010).
102. Id.
103. In this Note, the term “commercialization of space” is understood to mean the
replacement of the government by commercial ventures in activities such as space travel,
exploration, and the exploitation of space resources. More generally, it is also understood to
imply a shift from the study and exploration of space to making a profit from activities in
space.
104. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 1985 § 110, Pub.
L. No. 98-361, 98 Stat. 422, 426 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2451(c) (2006)).
105. Commercial Space Launch Act § 3, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 70101(b) (2006)).
106. Id.
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The commercialization of space was further advanced in 2004, when
Congress passed the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of
2004 107 (Amendments Act). The Amendments Act “authorizes private and
commercial passengers to engage in space travel and establishes the
licensing of private sector spacecraft to bring paying passengers on
suborbital flights.” 108 Space law scholar Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz
believes that, since Congress has always granted power to the Department
of Transportation to license private spaceflight, it is “reasonable to expect
that [Congress] will grant [the Department of Transportation] orbital
licensing jurisdiction in the future.” 109
3. Industrial Policy Versus the Free Market: Differing Views
of Government Involvement in Commercial Enterprise
The United States has historically viewed commercial activities as
inherently the domain of the private sector, 110 including those in space. 111
The European view, however, has been that the space industry is by nature
an exercise in “industrial policy.” 112 Industrial policy is seen by European
nations as “a cooperative effort between government and industry to
promote the national interest.” 113 In other words, the boundary between
what is private activity in space, and what is government activity in space
may be seen differently in the United States as opposed to other nations. As
Gabrynowicz explains, the “U.S. government supplies and funds critical
space infrastructure and provides exclusive contracts to U.S. aerospace
companies.” 114
C. How Do We Enforce? The Procedural Posture of Claims
This section examines the legal issues relevant to bringing a lunar
property claim. Part I.C.1 discusses the applicable law. Part I.C.2
discusses the relevant policy issues.
107. Pub. L. No. 108-492, 118 Stat. 3974 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101–70121).
108. Gabrynowicz, supra note 101, at 413.
109. Id. at 421. “[O]rbital licensing jurisdiction” means the power to license private
orbital space flights. Id.; see also April Greene Apking, Note, The Rush To Develop Space:
The Role of Spacefaring Nations in Forging Environmental Standards for the Use of
Celestial Bodies for Governmental and Private Interests, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 429, 456–57 (2005) (laying out the federal regulations and licensing requirements for
private spaceflight). This regulatory adjustment is significant because it reveals a trend in
the executive branch toward helping companies exploit space’s commercial possibilities.
110. Gabrynowicz, supra note 101, at 424.
111. See Commercial Space, supra note 17, at 619 (noting the United States’ Commercial
Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 was “designed to promote the development of the
emerging commercial human space flight industry”); id. (explaining that the Act would
allow “the private sector to challenge the hegemony of [NASA] in space”).
112. Gabrynowicz, supra note 101, at 424.
113. Id.
114. Id. (describing the argument that the U.S. government supports space activity by
private U.S. companies as the “standing European response” to U.S. aerospace companies’
complaints that they have to compete “with commercial activities conducted by [European]
governments”).
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1. What Law Applies?
a. Applicable Tribunals
In the United States, property is a common law area, 115 and thus courts
of general jurisdiction, 116 such as state courts, 117 likely will hear lunar
property claims. 118 As noted above, the Outer Space Treaty provides that
nations retain legal authority over persons and equipment launched into
space from their territory. 119 Assuming an action to enforce a property
right was brought in the country from which the defendant launched, a
tribunal there has jurisdiction over the matter. 120
The International Court of Justice 121 (ICJ) has jurisdiction over claims
arising out of treaty obligations.122 If a launching state refuses to enforce
property rights against the defendant, the plaintiff can appeal to the ICJ for
the launching state’s failure to uphold the space treaties.123 However, a
plaintiff can only bring suit in the ICJ by convincing his country to bring

115. See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 31, at 1 (“[T]he common law is typically
divided into contracts, torts, and property.”).
116. Courts of general jurisdiction are courts “having unlimited or nearly unlimited trial
jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at
406. Jurisdiction is “a court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree.” Id. at 927.
117. See, e.g., Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic,
582 F.3d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Unlike state courts, which are courts of general
jurisdiction, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . .” (internal quotations
omitted)).
118. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“[E]very State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”).
119. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VIII (“A State Party to the Treaty on whose
registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control
over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial
body.”). The jurisdiction assigned by the Outer Space Treaty combines the internationally
recognized jurisdiction of courts over “a ship, aircraft, or other vehicle . . . registered under
the laws” of the country with jurisdiction over “nationals.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421 (1987). Note, however, that the
defendant is not necessarily a national of the country from which he launched, so the treaty
language does not fit perfectly into the Restatement’s rule.
120. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VIII. This assertion holds as long as any
internal rules of jurisdiction (which would depend on the country) are satisfied. In civil law
jurisdictions, property disputes would be handled in “ordinary courts.” GLENDON ET AL.,
supra note 42, at 66 (“The jurisdiction of the ordinary courts typically is limited to criminal
law and private law disputes.”); id. at 112–13 (noting that non-commercial “private law”
includes property law). Civil law courts traditionally only have jurisdiction over property
located within the territory of the court’s country. Cf. id.
121. The ICJ is a court created by the United Nations to hear disputes arising out of
international law. See generally INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1
(last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
122. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
123. See supra Part I.B.1.
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the suit on his behalf against the country of the defendant.124 The ICJ only
has the power to adjudicate when both countries submit to jurisdiction.125
b. Law of Treaty Interpretation
Under international law, treaties are to be given their literal meanings if
possible. 126 As the U.S. Supreme Court has written, “The clear import of
the treaty language controls unless ‘application of the words of the treaty
according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the
intent or expectations of its signatories.’” 127 Most other countries follow
this rule of treaty interpretation, which has been codified in the Vienna
Convention. 128
c. Laws and Doctrines of Property
In addition to considering treaties, courts would also apply their
countries’ own property laws. In doing so, courts will likely rely on a
background theoretical understanding of property peculiar to their legal
traditions. 129 Different countries’ laws on whether and to what extent
private persons may own land vary widely. 130
The ICJ would apply international property law.131 To determine the
relevant international law, the ICJ would consider treaties, customary
international law, and “general principles of law.” 132
A tribunal considering a question of international law also relies on
customary international law. 133 Customary international law, which is
extrapolated from the existing practice of nations. 134 constitutes binding
law in U.S. courts 135 unless Congress has explicitly legislated to the
124. ICJ Statute, supra note 122, at art. 34(1) (“Only states may be parties in cases before
the Court.”).
125. Id. at art. 36(1) (“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all case which the parties
refer to it . . . .”); id. at art. 38(1) (“The Court[’s] function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it . . . .”).
126. DETLEV F. VAGTS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 88 (4th ed. 2008);
see also Vienna Convention, supra note 83, at art. 31.
127. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (citation omitted)
(relying on long-held customary international law).
128. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, at art. 31.
129. See supra notes 24–40 and accompanying text (common law) and notes 58–64 and
accompanying text (civil law).
130. SPRANKLING ET AL., supra note 32, at 6. For example, Vietnam allows “legitimate”
private income and properties, but limits ownership of natural resources. Id.
131. ICJ Statute, supra note 122, at art. 38 (“The Court[’s] function is to decide in
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it . . . .”).
132. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
(1987).
133. See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 126, at 62–63.
134. ICJ Statute, supra note 122, at art. 38(1)(b).
135. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004) (holding that customary
international law rules prohibiting certain human rights abuses are applicable to cases
brought under the Alien Tort Statute); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (holding
that an international custom prohibiting seizure of fishing vessels in wartime was
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contrary. 136 One formulation holds that in order to constitute customary
international law, a practice must be “general and consistent” among
nations, and they must follow it “from a sense of legal obligation.” 137
“General principles of law” are rules of decision extrapolated by
comparing the wide variety of legal codes and judicial decisions of the
world’s countries to find a common theme or principle. 138 International
tribunals such as the ICJ use general principles of law to fill in gaps in the
rules of decision. 139 Legal scholar Ugo Mattei notes that property doctrine
in civil law jurisdictions and common law jurisdictions seem to converge in
ways that may provide “general principles of law” that are relevant here.140
For example, limits on the use of land that impairs the value of neighboring
land exist in both traditions. 141 If this type of legal doctrine is widespread,
the ICJ might recognize a “general principle” of nuisance law.142 However,
the approach of the civil and common law traditions is somewhat different,
since nuisance doctrine at common law is enforced by judges, while in civil
law jurisdictions, nuisance-like uses of neighboring property are prohibited
by “public law” regulations. 143
2. Policy Background: What Is the Court Really Thinking About?
Despite the general rule in favor of strictly literal treaty interpretation,144
courts in common law countries likely will interpret treaty language in light
of public policy. 145 Civil law courts are less likely to consider public policy
except in cases of nuisance-type actions. 146 While common law courts rely

enforceable as U.S. law); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
§ 114 (1987).
136. See generally Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987).
138. See Vienna Convention, supra note 83, at art. 53. See generally MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77–82 (4th ed. 1997).
139. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 66–67 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997) (holding, in the absence of relevant
treaty language, that “it is . . . a general principle of law” that duress mitigates guilt of
complicity in an atrocity, but that the legal systems of the world are too inconsistent with
regard to whether duress is a complete defense in such situations to supply a definite rule).
140. See generally MATTEI, supra note 58, at 18–21.
141. See id. at 19–20.
142. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 62–64.
143. See MATTEI, supra note 58, at 20. In the civil tradition, “public law” is distinct from
“private law” (which includes the law of property, see supra note 120); broadly, public law
concerns relations between citizens and the state, while private law concerns relations among
citizens and private entities. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 42, at 108. However, there is no
consensus among civil law lawyers of the terms’ respective scopes or the exact boundaries
between them. Id.
144. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
145. See MATTEI, supra note 58, at 198 (noting that common law courts, “in the United
States especially” have “traditionally shown close concern for public policy”).
146. Id. at 37 (noting that civil “private law” courts have been “precluded from making
decisions based on policy grounds,” leaving such concerns to “public law” courts).
THE UNITED STATES
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on public policy as an interpretive rule of decision, 147 civil law courts
analogously rely on theories such as “good morals” 148 and “principles of
natural justice.” 149
With respect to the applicable treaties, including the space treaties,150
there is evidence that countries have different priorities and, consequently,
different understandings of the “intent or expectations” 151 inherent in those
treaties. 152 Developed nations, for example, tend to favor an interpretation
of the “non-appropriation clause” 153 of the Outer Space Treaty that protects
private rights to acquire and exploit outer space resources for profit.154
Developing nations, however, prefer a strict interpretation of the clause,
because of their concern that “the major space powers . . . would capitalize
on their lead in space technology to exclude broad, international
participation in the exploration and settlement of space.” 155
The tension between these two policies is evident in both the vagueness
of the Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation clause 156 and the Moon
Agreement’s failure. 157 Most of the space-faring nations have refused to
sign the Moon Agreement because of its “restrictions on ownership and the
requirement of ‘equitable sharing.’” 158 Not all countries fall into their
expected camps under the model of a policy split between the developing
world and the developed world. For example, at the negotiation of the
Outer Space Treaty, France’s representative was concerned that the non147. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488 (Cal. 1990) (noting
that the decision to accept a novel interpretation of a common law cause of action raised
“important policy concerns” which must be “address[ed] openly”); id. at 498 (Arabian, J.,
concurring) (noting the case turned on a choice between “competing social or economic
policies,” and suggesting that such a choice would normally be appropriate for a court to
make (though not in that case)).
148. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 42, at 141 (describing French and German civil code
provisions that employ this phrase).
149. Id. at 144 (discussing the Austrian Civil Code of 1811). Civil law judges employ
such phrases as a form of “interpretation” where the codes or statutes are purportedly
unclear, or “to modify the effect of more rigid code provisions or to set the course of a new
development.” Id. at 139–41.
150. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
151. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982).
152. Both the Vienna Convention and the U.S. Supreme Court have held that an
appreciation of the intent of the signatories is necessary in interpreting treaties. See supra
notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
154. See Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of Mankind
Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule of Property Law, 69 J. AIR L. & COM.
689, 693 (2004); Fountain, supra note 82, at 1762–63.
155. Ryan Hugh O’Donnell, Staking a Claim in the Twenty-First Century: Real Property
Rights on Extra-Terrestrial Bodies, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 461, 480 (2007); see also Jeremy
L. Zell, Putting a Mine on the Moon: Creating an International Authority to Regulate
Mining Rights in Outer Space, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 489, 496 (2006).
156. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 41–42 (stating that the Outer Space Treaty’s
solution to disagreement between the U.S.S.R., which “wanted to ban all private enterprise
space activity,” and the United States, which opposed such a ban, was to “insert vague
language that could be interpreted whichever way the reader wanted”).
157. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
158. Fountain, supra note 82, at 1764.
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appropriation clause would leave room for private appropriation of outer
space territory, 159 and France later signed the more clearly anti-privateproperty Moon Agreement, though it has not ratified it.160
D. The “Common Heritage of Mankind” and Two Analogous Treaties
One difficulty in interpreting the space treaties’ effect on private property
rights is deciding whether the contentious “common heritage of mankind”
doctrine applies. 161 The most frequently recognized elements of the
common heritage principle are non-appropriation; shared international
management; sharing of benefits derived from resource exploitation;
peaceful use; and preservation. 162 Although the Moon Agreement—which
explicitly applies that doctrine to the moon—is a failed treaty, 163 one school
of thought holds that the common heritage of mankind doctrine originates
in the “province of all mankind” language 164 applied to the moon in the
Outer Space Treaty. 165 If this view is correct, the doctrine may
significantly limit lunar private property rights.166
Since some treaties have applied the common heritage of mankind
doctrine to internationally managed resources, at least one commentator has
found those treaties relevant in the context of lunar property rights.167
Relevant treaties include those governing Antarctica 168 and deep-sea
mining. 169

159. U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Summary of
the Record of the Seventeenth Meeting, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.70 (Oct. 21,
1966).
160. For a discussion of the difference between “signing” and “ratifying” a treaty, see
supra note 83.
161. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Comment, Moving the Heavens: Lunar Mining and the
“Common Heritage of Mankind” in the Moon Treaty, 42 UCLA L. REV. 575, 580–81 (1994)
(noting that the Moon Agreement “declares the mineral resources of the moon the ‘common
heritage of mankind,’” a phrase whose “ambiguity and ramifications . . . have left space law
one of the most unstable areas of international law”).
162. Barbara Ellen Heim, Note, Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A
Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica,
23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 827 (1990); see also Zell, supra note 155, at 497–98.
163. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
164. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. I, ¶ 1.
165. Hoffstadt, supra note 161, at 587.
166. See, e.g., Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 96 (noting that the common
heritage of mankind doctrine would force “commercial interests in the wealthier nations” to
share profits from outer space resources with poorer nations).
167. See, e.g., Heim, supra note 162, at 845.
168. See Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 96–97; Cody Tucker, Lunar Rights:
How Current International Law Addresses Rights to Use and Exploit Lunar Resources, the
Practical Difficulties Attached, and Solutions for the Future, 34 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L.
591, 612 (2009); Apking, supra note 109, at 452–53.
169. See Hoffstadt, supra note 161, at 592–95; Zell, supra note 155, at 500–01.
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1. Antarctic Law
Like the moon, Antarctica is a “vast expanse of land that is undeveloped
and contains mineral deposits.” 170 Also like the moon, the exploration and
use of Antarctic resources requires large investments of capital and
technology. 171 Following the early-nineteenth-century discovery that
Antarctica was a continent rather than a patchwork of ice islands, seven
countries successively claimed sovereignty in Antarctic territory over the
ensuing century. 172 The first attempt 173 by the international community to
regulate the use of Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty, 174 came into force in
the early 1960s. 175 The Antarctic Treaty’s stated purpose—to “ease the
tension surrounding [the] various sovereignty claims” 176—resembles the
Outer Space Treaty’s purpose of avoiding a race to claim sovereignty in
space as the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union
heated up. 177 While the space treaty regime appears to leave the right to
exploit mineral resources intact,178 mining in Antarctica is explicitly
prohibited by the Madrid Protocol. 179 Although the Antarctic Treaty does
not invoke the common heritage of mankind doctrine, at least one
commentator claims that the principle is widely understood to be applicable
to Antarctica.180
2. Law Governing Deep-Sea Mining
Like Antarctica, the deep seabed resembles the moon in that travelling
there and extracting resources is expensive and requires sophisticated
technology. 181 Mining of the deep seabed began in the late 1960s, when
the technology for extracting minerals from the ocean floor became
available. 182 Responding to the resulting opportunity and possible threat of
conflict, the international community constructed a legal regime to regulate
170. Sattler, supra note 82, at 32 (suggesting that the Antarctic regulatory regime is a
good model for regulating outer space exploration because of the similarities of extreme
environments and costs of exploration).
171. Id.
172. Buxton, supra note 154, at 696.
173. Heim, supra note 167, at 839.
174. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794.
175. Buxton, supra note 154, at 696.
176. Heim, supra note 167, at 839.
177. Buxton, supra note 154, at 696–97; see also supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
The Antarctic Treaty shows a concern similar to the Outer Space Treaty’s concern for
preventing the militarization of the new territory. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 174, pmbl.
(“[I]t is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes . . . .”).
178. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. I, ¶ 2 (“Outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States . . . .”).
179. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 7, Oct. 4, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1455, 1464 [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]; Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82,
at 97.
180. See, e.g., Buxton, supra note 154, at 696.
181. See Sattler, supra note 82, at 34.
182. Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in Search
of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 703, 726 (2001).
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undersea resource exploitation.183 After a series of incremental agreements,
which did not lay down rules for deep-sea mining, 184 these efforts
culminated in the 1982 United Nations’ Third Law of the Sea
Convention 185 (UNCLOS). The United Nations General Assembly later
adopted a revised version of UNCLOS, the Implementation Agreement of
1994. 186
UNCLOS was the first treaty to use the “common heritage of mankind”
language. 187 The common heritage language in UNCLOS, later repeated in
the Implementation Agreement, prohibited territorial appropriation of the
seabed by national governments. 188 The 1982 UNCLOS also created an
International Seabed Authority (ISA), which licenses and regulates deepsea mining. 189 Before the 1994 revisions, the ISA “preempted free-market
enterprise” by giving all nations an equal vote in permitting access to the
seabed, regardless of “technological capabilities or contributions to
undersea exploration.” 190 As a result, most rich countries, including the
United States, refused to join UNCLOS in 1982. 191 However, the
Implementation Agreement substantially changed the “elaboration and
implementation” of the common heritage doctrine. 192 The changes
weakened the common heritage doctrine’s original intent to redistribute
resources from countries with the wealth and technology to exploit
undersea resources to the poorer nations that lack those capacities.193 Rich
countries’ reluctance to join UNCLOS until after the common heritage of

183. See id. (suggesting that there was a motive to help poor countries gain a fair share of
the world’s natural wealth); Heim, supra note 167, at 824 (alluding to the possibility of
conflict and environmental problems due to undersea mining).
184. See Heim, supra note 167, at 824–25.
185. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
186. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/48/263 (July 28, 1994) [hereinafter Implementation Agreement]; Hoffstadt, supra
note 161, at 593 (indicating that the Implementation Agreement was a revision of
UNCLOS).
187. Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 182, at 726 (describing former Maltese U.N.
ambassador Arvid Pardo’s proposal to include the “common heritage” language); Buxton,
supra note 154, at 694 (referring to Pardo as the “forefather of the common heritage of
mankind principle in the law of the sea”).
188. Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 182, at 726; see also Implementation Agreement,
supra note 186, pmbl.
189. Implementation Agreement, supra note 186; see also Sattler, supra note 82, at 34.
190. Sattler, supra note 82, at 34–35. One effect of this veto power would be to allow
developing nations a share of resource exploitation without sharing in the cost of investment.
191. Id. at 35; Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 96.
192. Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 96.
193. Id.; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Environment & Public Works, 108th Cong. 68 (2004) (statement of John F.
Turner, Asst. Sec’y, Bureau of Oceans and Int’l Envtl. and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of
State) (explaining that the 1994 amendments to UNCLOS in the Implementation Agreement
give the United States veto power over any attempt to force sharing of profits derived by
U.S. companies from undersea mining, thereby removing “flaws” which had kept the U.S.
from signing the original UNCLOS in 1982).
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mankind doctrine had been limited mirrors their rejection of the Moon
Agreement for endorsing the doctrine.194
Whether the common heritage of mankind doctrine applies to lunar
property claims will be a key argument of any litigation.195 The lunar
property litigator should be familiar with each side of the argument. 196
II. THE COMMENTATORS’ AND THEORISTS’ DISPUTE
The Outer Space Treaty prohibits “national appropriation [of the moon]
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other
means.” 197 This provision is generally understood to prohibit a nation from
claiming a part of the moon as territory under its jurisdiction.198 However,
there is a dispute over whether the provision prohibits “appropriation” by
private, non-governmental parties.199 Part II of this Note examines
different aspects of the conflict over the status of private property claims in
outer space. Part II.A examines different interpretations of the plain
language of the space treaty regime, focusing on the Outer Space Treaty’s
non-appropriation clause. Part II.B presents the conflicting opinions over
whether national registries of private claims are legal. Part II.B also
discusses conflicting interpretations of the only U.S. court decision to
address property rights in celestial bodies. Part II.C explores different
opinions on the applicability of the common heritage of mankind principle
to outer space resources.
A. The Plain Language Dispute
Those who claim that the current treaty regime prohibits private property
on the moon argue that private claims would be “appropriation by other
means” within the meaning of the Outer Space Treaty. 200 Some opponents
claim that the Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation clause extends to
private parties through their citizenship in a member state.201 Those who
argue that private property rights can and do exist on the moon respond that
since the non-appropriation clause does not explicitly mention private

194. See supra notes 82–84, 87, 158 and accompanying text.
195. See infra Part III.A.3.
196. See infra Part II.C.
197. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. II.
198. See, e.g., CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE
47–48 (1982).
199. See John Adolph, Comment, The Recent Boom in Private Space Development and
the Necessity of an International Framework Embracing Private Property Rights to
Encourage Investment, 40 INT’L LAW. 961, 964 (2006). Compare CHRISTOL, supra note 198,
at 47–48, with GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 46 (Boris
Belitzky trans., 1984).
200. See, e.g., Tennen, supra note 89, at 805–06; see also Zell, supra note 155, at 499
(“Article II . . . stands for a prohibition of laying claim to private property in space.”).
201. See Sattler, supra note 82, at 28; Adolph, supra note 199, at 964 (arguing that
appropriation of lunar land by a private party would constitute appropriation “by . . . other
means” by the party’s country).
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individuals and companies, the treaty permits appropriation by them.202
Opponents rebut this argument, calling it an excessively literal reading of
the non-appropriation clause. 203
One argument that opponents rely on looks to the legislative history of
the Outer Space Treaty in interpreting its plain language. 204 The argument
maintains that a statement of the United States representative to the United
Nations General Assembly during the negotiations of the Outer Space
Treaty supports this view. 205 Representative Arthur J. Goldberg said to the
Assembly that “as we stand on the threshold of the space age, our first
responsibility as governments is clear: we must make sure that man’s
Other
earthly conflicts will not be carried into outer space.” 206
commentators do not go as far, but maintain that the quote shows that the
Outer Space Treaty was conceived by all parties as discouraging private
property claims. 207
Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes counter that Article II’s nonappropriation language is a “substantially meaningless face-saving
formulation,” designed to resolve the impasse during treaty negotiations
between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, who “adamantly
opposed . . . the Communist proposal to ban all private enterprise space
activity.” 208 They maintain that the legislative history shows that the treaty
language was meant to preserve the possibility of private property in
space. 209
Those asserting the existence of private lunar property rights also argue
that the Outer Space Treaty’s restriction on “national appropriation by claim
202. Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L.
REV. 349, 351 (1969); Wayne N. White, Jr., Presentation at the 40th Colloquium on the Law
of Space of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics: Real Property in Outer
Space 1 (Oct. 6–10, 1997), available at http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/real_
property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml; see also Coffey, supra note 82, at 125–26; Wasser &
Jobes, supra note 8, at 44–46; Fountain, supra note 82, at 1762–63.
203. See, e.g., O’Donnell, supra note 155, at 481 (arguing that the non-appropriation
clause prohibits appropriation by private parties although the clause does not specifically
mention them).
204. Buxton, supra note 154, at 700 (interpreting Representative Arthur J. Goldberg’s
statement to express opposition to “first in time, first in right” private property claims); see
also G. Harry Stine, Patricia M. Sterns, & Leslie I. Tennen, Preliminary Jurisprudential
Observations Concerning Property Rights on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies in the
Commercial Space Age, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 50, 54 (1996) (arguing that if the Outer Space Treaty allowed private parties to
appropriate outer space territory, “[w]ars of conquest . . . could result” just as if nations
themselves had done the appropriating).
205. See Buxton, supra note 154, at 700; Stine et al., supra note 204, at 54.
206. Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Rep. to the U.N. Gen. Assemb., Address Before the U.N.
Gen. Assemb. (Dec. 17, 1966), in 56 DEP’T ST. BULL. 78, 81 (1967).
207. See, e.g., Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 59, 63
(1999) (arguing that Goldberg’s statement shows that “[c]reating a space property
law . . . was not a priority,” resulting in an Outer Space Treaty that is “at worst[] hostile to
the privatization and commercialization of space resources”).
208. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 57.
209. Id. (arguing that the vague language was a way for the U.S. to preserve for future
negotiation the possibility of private property in space in the face of Soviet opposition); see
also Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 41 n.15.
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of sovereignty” 210 cannot be understood as restricting private individuals’
claims, since governments are frequently subject to restrictions that do not
apply to their citizens. 211 Opponents of this view argue, however, that
treating private property claims in space as separate from claims of
sovereignty by governments is a false distinction.212 They contend that
private ownership of parts of celestial bodies is forbidden because such
ownership would presuppose a territorial sovereign competent to confer
title, the very sovereignty prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty.213
Proponents respond that private entities that seek to exploit outer space
resources would not necessarily be composed of citizens of one country.214
Moreover, the Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention speak in terms
of “launching states,” rather than “citizens” of a particular country. 215 As a
result, the argument concludes, recognition of private land claims by a
government would not be tantamount to claiming sovereignty over outer
space territory by that government. 216
B. The Problem of Registering and Recognizing Claims
Those espousing the possibility of lunar private property suggest that
establishing a registry to keep track of such land claims would not be
appropriation under the Outer Space Treaty. 217 They also argue that a
registry operated by a signatory nation to the Outer Space Treaty would not
violate the Treaty’s prohibition of “appropriation by other means” because
the language of the Treaty does not explicitly prohibit such registries.218

210. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. II.
211. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 56 (observing that, for example, a U.S. citizen may
adopt a particular religion, get married, or engage in “numerous trade and commercial
activities,” while such activities are prohibited to the government); see also id. at 56–57
(stating that “[p]rivate citizens do not suddenly become mere legal parts . . . of the State
because the State authorizes and supervises their space activities” and concluding that the
framers of the Outer Space Treaty must not have intended to prevent such private ownership
in space).
212. See, e.g., Tennen, supra note 89, at 805 (arguing that such claims present a “classic
distinction without a difference”).
213. Press Release, Statement of the Board of Directors of the International Institute of
Space Law (IISL), INT’L INST. OF SPACE L. (Mar. 22, 2009), http://www.iislweb.org/docs/
Statement%20BoD.pdf.
214. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 53–54; cf. Fountain, supra note 82, at 1778 &
n.161 (describing the likely multi-national makeup of future companies investing in outer
space resource exploitation).
215. The “launching state” is the country from which persons or equipment were
launched. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text; see also Wasser & Jobes, supra
note 8, at 54 & n.71 (discussing the orientation of the space treaty regime around “launching
states”); cf. Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 84–85 & n.11 (noting that
governments “may also be held absolutely liable for the actions of their citizens in space,”
but citing to the Liability Convention in the footnote, which elaborates the “launching state”
theory of liability).
216. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 53–54.
217. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. II; Pat Dasch et al., Conference on Space
Property Rights: Next Steps, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 174, 178 (2000).
218. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 46.
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Opponents respond that a nation that kept such a registry would be in
violation of the treaty. 219 The only value of such a registry would be to
provide a legal basis for claimants to exclude others from the land at
issue. 220 Providing such a legal basis, the opponents argue, is tantamount
to exerting sovereignty over that land. 221 Opponents also argue that the
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada’s holding in Nemitz v. United
States 222 creates precedent that private ownership of celestial bodies is
prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty. 223 The plaintiff, Gregory Nemitz,
claimed property in an asteroid through registration with the Archimedes
Institute. 224 The court held that neither Nemitz’s website registration of his
claim, nor the United States’ refusal to join the Moon Agreement, 225 nor the
language of the Outer Space Treaty “created any rights in Nemitz to
appropriate private property rights on asteroids.” 226
Proponents argue that such reasoning confuses invalid attempts to claim
lunar land from Earth with legitimate claims based on actual presence on
the surface of the moon. 227 Professors Wasser and Jobes suggest that
“actual occupation and use” of the claimed land would materially change
the situation, and consequently the outcome, in Nemitz. 228 A related view
holds that claiming outer space property simply through registration on a
website is “downright silly,” 229 but that regardless of these flawed claims,
international custom has produced a set of property rights sufficient for
private exploitation. 230

219. Tennen, supra note 89, at 805 (“The mere recognition of claims by a state [by
keeping a registry] would constitute a de facto exclusion of other states and their nationals,
and thereby constitute a form of national appropriation.”).
220. Id.
221. See Virgiliu Pop, Appropriation in Outer Space: The Relationship Between Land
Ownership and Sovereignty on the Celestial Bodies, 16 SPACE POL’Y 275, 278 (2000).
222. No. CV-N030599, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004).
223. Coffey, supra note 82, at 140 (claiming that the Nemitz decision supports a view of
“the current legal framework [as] barring real property rights in space”). As the text, infra,
accompanying notes 302–08 suggests, the legal effect of Nemitz in future lunar property
disputes appears limited. Nevertheless, as the only example of an actual United States court
examining an outer space property claim, potential litigants and contract drafters in this area
may utilize its reasoning in pursuing lunar property claims.
224. Nemitz,
2004
WL
3167042,
at
*1;
see
ARCHIMEDES
INST.,
http://www.permanent.com/ep-archi.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
225. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
226. Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042, at *2.
227. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 50–52 (arguing that such claims would be
legitimate because there exists a universal rule that first possession gives rise to ownership).
228. Id. (arguing that actual possession of lunar land would give ownership a firmer basis
than claims made merely from Earth).
229. James E. Dunstan, Toward a Unified Theory of Space Property Rights: Sometimes
the Best Way to Predict the Weather Is to Look Outside, in SPACE: THE FREE-MARKET
FRONTIER, supra note 59, at 223, 228.
230. Id. at 225–26 (“[C]ustomary international law, consistent with the Outer Space
Treaty, has come to develop a regime for property use that is compatible with private
investment, even if it does not directly mirror Western concepts of real property
ownership.”).
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Although claims of ownership resulting from the purchase of a
certificate and registration on a website are invalid,231 such specious claims
do not invalidate a registry of claims made by persons in actual possession
of lunar land. 232
C. The Common Heritage of Mankind Doctrine’s Application to Private
Property Claims in Space
The meaning of the common heritage of mankind doctrine233 and
whether it applies to the moon is another point of contention. Opponents of
lunar property rights point to Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, which
provides that “[t]he exploration and use of . . . the moon . . . shall be carried
out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their
degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of
all mankind.” 234 They claim that “any resource or benefit derived from
[lunar] resources . . . should serve all mankind.” 235 When Article I of the
Outer Space Treaty is read together with Article II, opponents argue, the
treaty seems to prohibit private exclusive possession of lunar property.236
These observers point out, moreover, that at the time the Outer Space
Treaty was passed, all of the ratifying countries had reason to support the
common heritage doctrine.237 Although the Outer Space Treaty lacks the
actual words “common heritage of mankind,” some commentators hold that
Articles I and II imply an equivalent restriction on exclusive use, 238 or
Furthermore,
implicitly contain the common heritage doctrine. 239
opponents contend that the “non-appropriation” language in Article II of the
Outer Space Treaty was motivated by developing nations’ fears of being
left behind in the exploitation of outer space resources by more

231. See, for example, Gregory Nemitz’s attempt to claim property in an asteroid through
a website’s registry. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text; see also LUNAR
EMBASSY, http://www.lunarembassy.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (a website purporting
to offer lunar land for sale).
232. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 50–51 (arguing that registration of claims “based
on true occupation and use of the land” would not constitute appropriation by the launching
state).
233. See supra notes 163–67, 188–89 and accompanying text.
234. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. I.
235. See Mary E. Schwind, Open Stars: An Examination of the United States Push to
Privatize International Telecommunications Satellites, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 87,
93 (1986).
236. Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. INT’L L.
& PRAC. 359, 364 (1994); see also CHRISTOL, supra note 198, at 47–48 (noting that the Outer
Space Treaty’s purpose—to ensure “opportunity to use is open to all”—casts doubt on the
possibility of rights to exclude).
237. Adolph, supra note 199, at 964 (arguing that the intent of the Outer Space Treaty at
the time it was signed is in harmony with the common heritage doctrine).
238. Id.; see also Hoffstadt, supra note 161, at 587–88 (suggesting that the Moon
Agreement’s “common heritage” language originated in the Outer Space Treaty’s Article I
“province of all mankind” language).
239. Fountain, supra note 82, at 1762 (“The concepts expressed in the Preamble, and
Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty . . . form the basis of the Common Heritage
doctrine as applied to outer space.”).
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technologically advanced nations, 240 the same motivation that brought the
common heritage language into the Moon Agreement.241 Consequently,
opponents argue, the meaning of Article II must be understood as a version
of the common heritage doctrine. 242 This means that Article II must
prohibit lunar private property. 243
Proponents of lunar property rights argue that opponents exaggerate the
importance of the “province of all mankind” language of the Outer Space
Treaty. 244 The proponents point out that the Moon Agreement 245 was
rejected by almost all the space-faring nations precisely because it made
explicit an anti-property principle that is arguably only implicit in the Outer
Space Treaty. 246 The Moon Agreement explicitly includes common
heritage language, 247 restricts private ownership, 248 and provides for
“equitable sharing” of the benefits of any exploitation. 249 For some, the
widespread rejection of the Moon Agreement is proof that the existing
treaty regime excludes the common heritage doctrine, 250 thus allowing
private ownership of lunar land and resources. 251
Even if the common heritage doctrine is an implicit principle of the Outer
Space Treaty, proponents argue, that doctrine should be understood by its
definition in UNCLOS. 252 Proponents of lunar property rights argue that
UNCLOS’s definition of common heritage of mankind allows for “free
use,” with the result that, while outer space itself may not be appropriated,
its resources may. 253
Opponents contend, however, that the common heritage doctrine
prohibits any claims to private property in space, whether one relies on
UNCLOS or the Moon Agreement for a definition.254 The application of
the common heritage doctrine in outer space would mean that the benefits

240. See, e.g., Carl Q. Christol, Article 2 of the 1967 Principles Treaty Revisited, 9
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 217 (1984); see supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text.
241. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the Twenty-First Century,
25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 225, 230–31 (1992).
242. O’Donnell, supra note 155, at 477, 480–81.
243. Id.
244. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. I, ¶ 1; Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 43.
245. See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
246. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 42–43; Fountain, supra note 82, at 1763–64.
247. Moon Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 11(1) (“The moon and its resources are the
common heritage of mankind . . . .”).
248. Id. at art. 11(3) (“Neither . . . the moon, nor any part thereof . . . shall become
property of any . . . non-governmental entity or of any natural person.”).
249. Id. at art. 11(7)(d) (stating that members are committed to “[a]n equitable sharing by
all States [sic] Parties in the benefits derived from . . . [lunar] resources, whereby the
interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries
which have contributed . . . to the exploration . . . shall be given special consideration.”).
250. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 42–43 (noting that the Moon Agreement “would
have banned all private property in space,” causing the United States, among others, to reject
it, with the result that the Agreement is “not a part of international law”).
251. Coffey, supra note 82, at 127–28; Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 42 n.19.
252. See, e.g., Husby, supra note 236, at 369–70; see also supra Part I.D.2.
253. See, e.g., Husby, supra note 236, at 370.
254. See, e.g., Zell, supra note 155, at 499.
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of any resources extracted from the moon would be distributed equally to
all nations, precluding ownership by any traditional definition.255
III. THE AMBIGUITY OF LUNAR PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND A SUGGESTION FOR RESOLVING IT
This part gives an answer to whether property rights exist on the moon,
concluding that they probably do not. Part III.A argues that the theoretical
question, “Do lunar property rights exist?” is in fact the same as the
practical question, “Can a plaintiff win a suit to protect his lunar property?”
Part III.A therefore answers both questions by presenting a hypothetical
lunar property litigation. Part III.A suggests which arguments from Part II
will be considered by the relevant court, and how the court will decide
between the opposing arguments.
Part III.B offers a solution to the ambiguity in the law. Part III.B argues
that the Moon Agreement should be rehabilitated and implemented with an
international regulating body, thus making practicable commercial
exploitation while unquestionably ruling out private claims to property.
A. What If Lunar Property Litigation Happened Tomorrow?
The Law as It Stands Today
If litigation over lunar property commenced tomorrow, a purported
owner would likely claim an injury arising out of a trespass, 256 an unlawful
ouster, 257 or a nuisance in the vicinity that prevented him from extracting
value from the land. 258 These injuries, had they occurred on Earth, would
be subject to remedy. A plaintiff would have possessory actions or
proprietary actions in civil law countries,259 and the law of trespass,
ejectment, and nuisance in common law countries.260
Part III.A looks at each stage of a hypothetical litigation and the best
arguments for each side, given the current state of lunar property law. Part
III.A.1 focuses on a court’s likely reasoning with respect to whether it has
jurisdiction, concluding that a U.S. court probably will find jurisdiction
because of the traditional focus on jurisdiction, combined with the
preference for reading treaties literally and the Outer Space Treaty’s explicit
jurisdictional grant. Parts III.A.2 and III.A.3 then address a court’s ability
to enforce the plaintiff’s claimed rights. Part III.A.3 concludes that a court
255. If the profits of outer space resources have to be “equitably distributed,” then the
party who invested in extracting them does not really own them. See Buxton, supra note 154,
at 692 (explaining the view of “less-developed nations” of the common heritage doctrine);
see also Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 92 (recounting that “a few United
States companies,” considering an unmanned mining expedition to the moon which was to
land in Australia, abandoned their plans because, as a party to the Moon Agreement with its
common heritage language, Australia might confiscate any minerals returned from outer
space).
256. See supra notes 20, 66, 69 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 21, 65 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text.
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probably will not be able to enforce a judgment because the Outer Space
Treaty may prohibit private lunar property, and given ambiguous treaty
language, U.S. courts will rely on legislative history to find the
interpretation prohibiting lunar private property the most reasonable one.
Part III.A.3 suggests the policy arguments likely to be considered by the
court. Finally, Part III.A.4 describes how a lunar property claim might be
argued in the ICJ, concluding that, although the ICJ would hear the dispute,
it would be unlikely to rule in favor of the plaintiff because of the dominant
developing-country view against recognizing private lunar property.
1. The First Hurdle: Jurisdiction
The lunar litigator’s first job will be convincing the court that it has
jurisdiction over a matter. This subsection suggests the best arguments and
counterarguments for a court taking jurisdiction in a lunar property case,
and concludes that U.S. courts probably will find that they have
jurisdiction, but that courts in other countries will not.
Any country from which equipment or people are launched into space
retains “jurisdiction and control” over them, according to the Outer Space
Treaty. 261 Furthermore, countries are required to register any such
launches, and all have licensing systems in place.262 If damage is caused by
an actor in space, the Liability Convention allows the injured party to make
a claim against the country from which the actor launched (Launching
State). 263 The Liability Convention, article XI(2), states that “natural or
juridical persons” are allowed to sue on liability “in the courts or
administrative tribunals . . . of a launching state.”264
The plaintiff should bring suit in the courts of general jurisdiction of the
defendant’s Launching State.265 The Registry Convention assures that
there would be a record of the Launching State of any defendant on file
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.266 The defendant should
first try to convince the court that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim.
A United States court likely will find that it has jurisdiction based on the
following reasoning. The defendant is liable for damage to the plaintiff’s
property on the moon. The court will note that, since the Outer Space
Treaty’s Article VIII states that the Launching State retains “jurisdiction
and control over” persons and objects launched from its territory, the court
has jurisdiction over the defendant under the treaty. 267 If the defendant
launched from the United States, U.S. courts have jurisdiction over his
person and his equipment, even while they are on the moon.

261. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 108–09 and
accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 91.
266. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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U.S. courts have historically focused on jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant more than territorial jurisdiction. 268 This means the court
likely will accept jurisdiction, since it is premised on the treaty’s apparent
grant of jurisdiction specifically over the person of the defendant. 269 The
strongest counter-argument that the court will consider is that it should
refuse to assert jurisdiction over the property because it is outside the
territory of the United States. 270 The property must be outside the territory
of the United States pursuant to the non-appropriation clause of the Outer
Space Treaty. 271
Moreover, the overall language of the Liability Convention suggests that
the treaty’s purpose is to address liability for accidental damage to
equipment, not damage to property interests, though such damage may
technically be tortious. Then again, the treaties are meant to be read as
strictly as possible; courts are traditionally more careful, with treaties as
opposed to statutes, about finding legislative intent that is not explicit in the
language. 272 Courts will only look to the legislative intent of a treaty when
a literal interpretation would clearly frustrate the purposes of the drafters.273
Here, the ambiguity in the space treaties with respect to private property
helps the plaintiff. If there is any doubt about what the intent of the drafters
was, then it is more difficult to argue that the intent is being frustrated.
Consequently the court will limit itself to the language of the treaties, which
grants jurisdiction.
In other countries, the plaintiff’s chances are weaker. Civil law countries
have a natural rights theory of property, 274 which helps the plaintiff. The
plaintiff will have established possession, and thereby natural rights, over
the lunar property. 275 However, civil law countries also have a stronger
tradition of territorial jurisdiction than the United States. 276 A civil law
tribunal would be unlikely to recognize jurisdiction over purported property
located outside the tribunal’s country. 277 The fact that the Liability
Convention only applies to torts against equipment and persons therefore
would be more persuasive in civil law countries. The “jurisdiction and
control” referred to in the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention
is unlikely to convince civil law countries’ courts to assert jurisdiction
extraterritorially, in the face of long-standing tradition. Civil law countries’
courts are more likely to see the treaties’ jurisdictional language as
analogous to the internationally recognized understanding of “nationality”
jurisdiction whereby a court retains jurisdiction over its country’s nationals,

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
See supra note 118.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 120.
See supra note 120.
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wherever they are. 278 However, “nationality” jurisdiction has never led to
extraterritorial jurisdiction over property. 279 The only countervailing
argument for a civil law court is that extraterritorial jurisdiction over
property has not been recognized only because, in practice, real property is
always located in some country’s territory. A civil law tribunal may also
consider the practical aspects of the situation. Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty rules out lunar property located in any nation’s territory 280 and
therefore, if the tribunal fails to exert jurisdiction, it would leave
unremedied an injury by an individual over whom the space treaties give it
“jurisdiction and control.” Ultimately, however, the weight of tradition is
against this line of reasoning in civil law countries. Civil law countries lack
a tradition of precedent, whereby tribunals are free to craft the law to adjust
to changing circumstances. 281 Consequently, a civil law tribunal would
likely refuse jurisdiction.
In countries that have adopted the Moon Agreement, with its restrictive
view of private property, a court is even less likely to assert jurisdiction
over a lunar property claim. 282 The treaty specifically rules out private
property on the moon. 283 Consequently, courts whose countries’ are party
to the Moon Agreement would likely conclude that the space treaties
collectively must be interpreted to exclude jurisdiction over torts against
purported space property.
2. The Complaint
If the court accepts jurisdiction, the plaintiff will have to draft additional
elements of a complaint that alleges the elements of some tort against the
purported property. Since the United States is a common law country, 284 an
aggrieved purported owner of lunar property could bring an action in
ejectment if the defendant is occupying the property. Of the three examples
at the beginning of this Note, this would be the one between Companies D
and E. 285 In that example, after the plaintiff identifies resources and signals
his possession by, for example, leaving equipment at the site for future
extraction, the defendant forcibly removes the equipment and commences
extraction while excluding the purported owner. The hypothetical with
Companies A and B exemplifies a trespass.286 If the defendant occupied
the plaintiff’s purported property in a way that did not prevent the plaintiff
from using it, the action would be trespass. Finally, if the defendant were
using the neighboring land in a way that prevented the plaintiff from
278. See supra note 119.
279. See supra note 119 and accompanying text; cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 761–62 (2004) (observing that extraterritorial nationality jurisdiction arose in order to
deal with crimes such as piracy, not torts against property).
280. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 1–4, 20 and accompanying text.
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removing the resources he claimed, he would bring an action in nuisance.
This type of situation includes the hypothetical involving companies X
and Y. 287 Both nuisance and trespass claims could be brought together in
cases where objects intrude onto the plaintiff’s land as a byproduct of the
defendant’s activities on neighboring land. For example, dust removed
from the defendant’s land might fall on top of ice on the plaintiff’s land,
thus making water extraction more difficult or costly.
The line of reasoning that a court will consider on the side against finding
any remediable tort will likely be as follows. Even though the space
treaties give the court jurisdiction over the defendant and his equipment,
there is no wrong to be remedied since the plaintiff has no right in the
land. 288 Even if the space treaties are meant to address intentional torts
involving property, such liability can only apply to torts with respect to
equipment or resources once in the possession of a plaintiff post-extraction.
To allow a plaintiff to claim a property interest in resources in place or the
land that contains them would violate the non-appropriation clause of the
Outer Space Treaty. 289 Several interpretations 290 of the Outer Space Treaty
suggest that it prohibits private property claims on the moon by its plain
language 291 or by implication, since recognition 292 of such claims by the
courts of any member state would violate the treaty.
A court will weigh against these arguments by relying on the
commentary on the other side of the non-appropriation issue. 293 That is, if
the Outer Space Treaty intended to prohibit private property claims on the
moon, it would have said so explicitly, as in Article IX of the Moon
Agreement. 294 The fact that the Moon Agreement was widely rejected
shows that the United States and the other parties to the Outer Space Treaty
(most of whom rejected the Moon Agreement) were not agreeing to rule out
private property claims. 295
However, even if the court accepts the latter arguments over the former,
it would only lead the court to conclude that the possibility of lunar
property cannot be ruled out. In order to award a judgment to the plaintiff,
the court would still need to be convinced that it should positively
recognize and defend such property. The court would need to craft a new
rule that extends common law property rights to a place without a
government or a society. A court would not adopt this approach without
very strong policy arguments for why it should do so. 296 The next section
of this Note considers the policy arguments for and against such an
approach.
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3. Property in Outer Space: The Policy Arguments
The policy arguments a court will consider in favor of defending lunar
property rights are as follows. UNCLOS’s rejection by the United
States, 297 subsequent revisions making private exploitation and ownership
of the seabed easier, and subsequent eventual acceptance by the United
States, all suggest that the United States has a clear policy of recognizing
property in internationally managed areas that lack sovereignty. 298 The
moon is sufficiently analogous to the deep seabed that the United States’
policy interests may be the same for each. Just as the United States insisted
on the right to exploit undersea resources, it similarly may have intended to
retain that right on the moon.
On the other hand, the court will be faced with the competing argument
that the policy behind the space treaties was to prevent the militarization of
space, not to preserve private property rights. The history of the Outer
Space Treaty negotiations demonstrates that property rights were barely
considered. 299 In the absence of a clear expression of United States policy,
the court might do best to avoid creating law in a literal and figurative
vacuum. It is true that, though not a focus, property rights were mentioned
on a few occasions during the Outer Space Treaty negotiations.300
However, the court likely will decide that those few occasions are not
sufficient to decide the issue in favor of defending lunar property rights.
United States policy toward the seabed as illustrated by the story of
UNCLOS is less ambiguous than U.S. policy toward the moon as illustrated
by the story of the space treaties. 301
The U.S. policy toward the commercialization of space will weigh in
favor of defending lunar property rights. 302 Since the 1984 Commercial
Space Launch Act,303 the United States has consistently encouraged the
commercial exploitation of space. 304 The court will have to note that
Nemitz v. United States 305 rejected the argument that the United States’
policy of supporting the commercialization of space conferred any property
right on Nemitz. 306 However, Nemitz does not convincingly decide the
issue here, since Nemitz did nothing to establish his purported property
claim except for registering the claim on a website.307 Alan Wasser and
Douglas Jobes were correct in their assessment that actual presence and
possession of the land should make a difference in the enforceability of a
claim of ownership. 308 Courts should not enforce property claims made
297.
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See supra notes 190–91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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merely by registering the claim from a distance because such a claim does
not provide a clear signal to people who are on-site and might lay claim to
the land. Claims through registration only would create an opportunity for
conflict because no claimant would reasonably know of other claimants.
However, if the claim is made on-site, the situation is different: anyone
who goes to the land will see that it has been marked or fenced, thus
reducing the possibility of conflict. Moreover, claims made from a distance
imply no intent to use the claimed land to benefit society, since the claimant
has made no investment to that end. On the other hand, a claim made onsite implies the claimant will start using the land to produce value for
society. Otherwise, he would have no reason to invest in going there and
marking the land. For these reasons, if the land were fenced or occupied
with the plaintiff’s equipment, a court likely would find the situation to be
materially different from the situation in Nemitz.
Other countries’ courts, assuming they decide to take jurisdiction over
the dispute, 309 are likely to be even less hospitable to lunar property claims
than United States courts. In civil law countries, the court would initially
have a reason to be open to lunar property rights: the natural law theory of
property. 310 Under the natural law theory, property rights originate in
possession, not sovereignty. 311 Consequently, the court might initially be
swayed by the argument that rights in lunar land vest when a person takes
and signals possession. However, the court will be confronted with the
counterargument that the Outer Space Treaty’s Article II non-appropriation
clause 312 rules out private possession. Even if in a vacuum possession
would ripen into property rights, the treaty regime exists to prevent that
progression occurring on the moon. While the court might consider that a
private party’s claim may not be subject to Article II, since it only limits
“national appropriation by claim of sovereignty,” the court will ultimately
find that argument unconvincing. Private property claims would be
considered by civil courts to amount to such “appropriation . . . by any other
means.” A court outside the United States likely will find the defendant’s
argument convincing on this point.
European countries’ courts 313 are likely to conclude that “private”
companies acting on the moon are acting on behalf of the government from
whose territory the plaintiff launched. The European notion of “industrial
policy” 314 sees actions by private companies in conjunction with or
encouraged by the government to be equivalent to actions of those
governments in space. 315 This means that, for example, a private company
which was extracting minerals or water from the moon under contract to
309. An unlikely result. See supra Part III.A.1.
310. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
313. A defendant who did not launch from the United States would most likely have
launched from a European country, Russia, China, or India, since these are the other
countries with active space programs. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
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supply a United States government-funded scientific research mission
would be equivalent to the government extracting the resources itself.316
Consequently, the non-appropriation clause would bar the purported private
property claims, because it would simply be the government-contractor’s
“appropriation by other means.” 317
The court of a developing country318 is also likely to be convinced that
the common heritage of mankind doctrine319 is implied in the Outer Space
Treaty’s Article I. 320 Developing countries are especially friendly to the
common heritage of mankind doctrine because it preserves their right to a
portion of the profit from outer space resources, even without contributing
to the extraction. 321 Moreover, even if developing countries were not able
to extract a share of such profits, the common heritage doctrine would give
them veto power over outer space resource exploitation, thus preserving the
resources until those countries have developed the wealth and technology to
compete for the resources’ exploitation on equal footing. 322 For these
reasons, a court outside the United States would be unlikely to act to defend
a private claim to lunar property.
In addition to any usual avenues of appeal, since lunar property claims
may be grounded in a set of treaties, one final appeal beyond the appeals to
domestic courts is available: the claim can be brought before the ICJ.323
The next subsection will discuss the ICJ’s likely line of deliberation in, and
the likely outcome of, such an appeal.
4. Litigating Lunar Property Claims in the ICJ
The hypothetical lunar property plaintiff faces several difficulties with
suit in the ICJ. First, the plaintiff would have to convince his government
to present the claim to the Launching State of the defendant under the Outer
Space Treaty. 324 The plaintiff’s state may refuse to do so for diplomatic or
political reasons. On the other hand, the United States and other wealthy
countries would have a strong interest in prosecuting a property claim on
behalf of the large corporations most likely to have such a claim in the first
place. Such business organizations provide employment, investment, and
tax revenue that may be politically important enough to overcome
countervailing concerns. Next, the defendant’s Launching State may refuse
the jurisdiction of the ICJ. 325 The ICJ Statute’s default rule requires state
parties to a dispute to submit to the court’s jurisdiction, and none of the
space treaties contain a provision expressly granting jurisdiction to the ICJ.
316. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
318. A defendant might have launched from a developing country if it is a private
company looking for a cheap base on Earth.
319. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 162, 190 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text; note 215.
325. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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Then again, the United States and other wealthy countries can use
diplomatic pressure to encourage other countries to submit to ICJ
jurisdiction in a given case.
Assuming the ICJ does hear the case, the court would have to first decide
that there is a property right capable of being defended. The Liability
Convention’s article VIII(1) provides one avenue.326 Article VIII(1) states
that “[a] State . . . whose natural or juridical persons suffer damage, may
present to a launching State a Claim for compensation.” 327 The court
would consider the argument that the defendant’s actions with respect to the
purported property tortiously damaged the plaintiff. This damage can be
measured by the difference between the value of the resources the plaintiff
was able to extract (if any), and those he would have been able to extract
but for the defendant’s actions. On the other hand, the court will reason
that the Liability Convention is only intended to address tortious injury to
persons and equipment, not real property. In other words, the plaintiff
would be indirectly trying to gain ICJ recognition of private property.
However, the ICJ would reason that recognizing such a right would be
contrary to the Outer Space Treaty’s Article II prohibition on such private
property. Then again, the ICJ will consider, as discussed in Parts III.A.2
and 3, that the treaty regime does not rule out private property, but only
“national appropriation.” 328 There might be a “general principle of law”
whereby possession of un-owned land confers ownership. 329 If enough
countries follow this rule, the ICJ may accept it as a “general principle” of
international law binding upon it. However, even if the ICJ recognizes such
a “general principle” of property through first possession, the ICJ likely will
decide that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty counsels strongly against
recognizing private lunar property. Since the language of the treaty is
ambiguous, the ICJ must look to the intent of the drafters and the policies
the member states implicitly agreed to when they signed.
As in most international bodies, developed countries are outnumbered by
developing countries in the United Nations, and ICJ judges are drawn from
the member countries of the United Nations. 330 As noted in the preceding
subsection, developing countries are likely to be inhospitable to private
property claims to parts of the moon or its resources. Consequently, an ICJ
tribunal would likely decide that private property rights in the moon are
prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty’s Article II.
B. Toward a Clearer Regime for Property Rights on the Moon
As the foregoing discussion elucidates, whether or not property rights
exist on the moon 331 is not easy to determine. The best prediction given the
current state of the law is “probably not.” This subsection argues that the
326.
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best solution to the lack of clarity in the current legal regime is to establish
an international agency that will distribute exclusive licenses to exploit
particular plots of lunar land. Part III.B.1 argues that the Moon Agreement
should be supplemented with an implementation agreement that makes it
palatable to developed countries, similar to the one that made UNCLOS
successful. 332 Part III.B.2 suggests guidelines for balancing the interests of
developing countries with those of developed countries.
1. An International Moon Authority
Subsection 5 of the Moon Agreement’s Article 11 commits parties to the
Agreement to “establish an international regime . . . to govern the
exploitation of the natural resources of the moon.” 333 Such a regime should
be created as soon as possible to deal with the coming lunar gold rush.334
The regime should be modeled on the Implementation Agreement that
revised UNCLOS. 335
The Moon Agreement faces the same problem that UNCLOS
encountered before the Implementation Agreement existed: the common
heritage of mankind doctrine. 336 The Moon Agreement’s common heritage
language should be “elaborat[ed] and implement[ed]”337 with an
international body that issues licenses for exploitation of lunar resources.
That body should issue licenses subject to limitations negotiated among all
countries. This solution mirrors the solution to UNCLOS’s initial failure,
which was to change the mandate of the ISA, the supervisory body charged
with overseeing the exploitation of undersea resources.338
The amended Moon Agreement should be implemented with an
international body charged with procedures acceptable to developed
countries. 339 The procedures should be set forth in a founding document
for an International Moon Authority (IMA). For example, the IMA should
not give member countries a veto over any license. 340 The document
creating the IMA should also rule out any redistribution of the profits from
any private activity on the moon to poorer countries. 341 Conversely, the
IMA’s founding document should reaffirm the Moon Agreement’s
prohibition of private property claims on the moon. 342 The IMA should be
sheltered from international political pressure343 by having a clear rulebook
332. See supra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.
333. Moon Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 11(5); see supra note 88 and accompanying
text.
334. See supra notes 11–19 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 181–86 and accompanying text.
336. See supra Part I.D.
337. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text.
339. This solution would mirror the international approach toward property rights to the
deep seabed. See supra notes 186–92 and accompanying text.
340. Cf. supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
342. Moon Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 11(3); see supra note 87; cf. supra note 188
and accompanying text.
343. See supra Parts I.C.2, III.A.3.
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about when to issue licenses, how many to issue, and what requirements
applicants must meet. The IMA should consist of a board of legal
professionals selected from within the U.N., tasked with approving or
denying license applications. The individuals who serve on the board
should be non-ideological and willing to follow the guidelines contained in
the IMA’s founding document.
To gain the assent of most countries, the IMA would have to address the
main area of tension, balancing the interests of technologically advanced,
space-faring nations, who can exploit lunar resources imminently, with the
interests of less-developed nations, who want to preserve lunar resources
for some future time when they have the capacity to exploit them. 344
2. The Lilliputians Versus Goliath: How to Balance the Interests
of Numerous Poor Countries Against Those of a Few Rich Countries
Space-faring nations are necessarily technologically advanced.
Developing nations, however, generally lack the technological capacity to
exploit resources in difficult environments such as Antarctica, the deep
seabed, and the moon. 345 Consequently, developed and developing nations
have contradictory incentives. On the one hand, developed nations have an
incentive to extract as much profit from the moon as possible while their
technological lead over developing nations exists.346 Developing nations,
on the other hand, have the contrary incentive, to preserve lunar resources
undisturbed until some future time when they have the technology to
exploit them.
The current regime serves neither side’s interest well. Developed
nations’ potential to profit from lunar resources are threatened by the lack
of clarity over private parties’ claims to lunar land. Parties who develop
lunar land cannot even protect their investment from disturbances on
neighboring land. 347 At the same time, since no space-faring nations have
agreed to be bound by the Moon Agreement, developing nations’ future
interest in lunar resources are not protected. Since private property has not
been clearly ruled out by treaty, private lunar land grabs by people from
wealthy countries remain a threat to developing countries’ interests.
As with UNCLOS, developed countries have refused to be bound by the
Moon Agreement’s restrictive regime that effectively prohibits any
exploitation of lunar resources. 348 Bringing the rich countries into an
international regime such as the IMA proposed by this Note would place
limits on rich countries’ exploitation of the moon. Such a regime would
more adequately protect developing countries’ interests in preserving the
moon for future exploitation than the current regime.
344. Cf. supra note 183.
345. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 170–71, 181–82
and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
347. Nuisances, for example. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text; for the
general unenforceability of such claims over lunar land, see supra Part III.A.
348. See supra notes 185–94 and accompanying text.
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Developing countries should have the right to sell and lease their right of
access to the moon to private parties who launch from developed countries.
This would allow the developing countries to share in some of the profits of
lunar exploitation, but only through the assent of a private party who wishes
to use that country’s reserve and agrees to pay for it. At the same time,
developed countries such as the U.S. would be more likely to accept such
an arrangement as a “free market” solution. 349
Such a regime would also benefit developing countries because their
citizens could capitalize on the technological reach of richer countries.
Citizens of developing countries could get financing from rich-country
banks and launch from a developed country, which would have technology
sufficiently advanced for launching a trip to the moon. The citizen’s home
country, meanwhile, could grant him access to a part of its lunar reserve for
a nominal fee. Assuming the venture was granted a license by the IMA, the
developing country could thus enable its citizen to profit from lunar
resources right away, without waiting for its technology to catch up.
The international community should act quickly to create a body to
manage the moon and its resources. Given all of the competing interests
involved, the alternative is a regression to primitive mechanisms such as
first possession, fences, and lawsuits. If, as is likely, lawsuits prove
ineffective, violent conflict is probably not far behind. The international
community has a chance to prevent a deterioration in mankind’s relations
with regard to the moon. That chance should be seized.
CONCLUSION
It is a cliché that familiarity breeds contempt. While that may be an
overstatement, it is true that as human knowledge of something increases,
that thing’s romance in the human imagination decreases. Since people
first stepped on the surface of the moon, it has become increasingly
familiar. Humans have come a long way from the days when the moon was
merely a mysterious orb in the sky. Now it is increasingly seen as a source
of potential profit.
The current legal regime was created while the afterglow of the first
direct contact with the moon lingered. That legal regime consequently
gives insufficient guidance with respect to the more prosaic problems that
now face humanity concerning the moon. If lunar property litigation were
to happen tomorrow, it would prove messy, expensive, and unpredictable:
messy because of the strong policy interests on all sides, expensive because
of the likely international character of the litigation, and unpredictable
because, as this Note has argued, the law is unsettled. Some transactional
lawyers believe their role is to prevent litigation. Now is the time for the
international community to act as the transactional lawyer for humanity by
clarifying the status of lunar property.

349. See supra Part I.B.2–3.

